






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































OO（A）?upo（1998）? ? rosa（1997）? ?
igures　in　parenthesis　present　the　years　of　input　of　new　models　to　the　market．　Platforms　are　classified　accord一
ng　to　each　segment　of　market　as　follows：A＝mini，
＝executive．
ource：Fourin（2000），　p．12L
＝sma l，　C lower　medium，　D＝upper　medium，
　　In　the　near　future，　the　German“Big　Three”will　retain　core　capabilities　of　development
nd　engineering　of　strategically　important　inside　elements（body　design，　power－train，
xhaust　and　the　like）；meanwhile，　they　will　probably　also　go　on　palpably　increasing　their
lobal－level　outsourcing，　from　external　module　mega－suppliers（Tier－1，“global　single
ourcing”），of　modules　without　technologically　strategic　importance．　From　early　stage　of
lanning，　these　module　suppliers　are　to　participate　as　significant　partners　in　the　joint　devel－
pment　of　new　car　models；they　will　also　undertake　comprehensive　functions　of　develop－
ent　and　engineering　of　modules，　and　supply　the　assembled　modules　directly（“JIT’りto　the
inal　assembly　areas　of　automotive　manufactures．　While　the　German“Big　Three”have
dopted　the　in－house　pattern　of　sourcing　in　their　plants　in　other　countries，　at　home　in
ermany　they　employ　the　industry－park　method3．　This　modular　sourcing　is　aimed　at　the
eduction　of　external　procurement　costs／management－cost，　as　well　as　of　expenses　and　time
ecessary　for　development　In　addition，　other　goals　of　modular　sourcing　also　include　the
ransfer　of　flexibility　demands（generated　from　diversified　needs　and　frequent　product
arket　changes）to　module　supplier　and，　on　the　part　of　the　car　producers　themselves，　the
horough　standardization（effective　exploitation　of　merits　of　mass　production）of　their　own
roduction　system．
　Apart　from　the　methods　described　above，　there　is　yet　another　alternative　in　use，　whereby　manu－
　facturer　of　finished　ready－to－drive　cars　can　carry　out　the　final　assembly　of　module　parts　at　logistic
　centres　adjacent　to　their　plants；anotable　example　is　in　operation　at　the　Audi　complex　in
　Ingolstadt，　Germany．　This　system　does　not　differ　greatly　from　previously　established，　conven－
　tional　methods　used　by　manufacturers　to　complete　component　assembly　at　sub－assembly　lines　in
　their　own　factories．
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　　　The　strategic　aims　of　modularization　are　twofold：attempting　to　overcome　global－level
cost－cutting　competition，　and　meanwhile　fulfilling　personal　requirements　of　customers，
who　are　constantly　becoming　individualistic（and　more　demanding）．　Pillar　and　Waringer
express　these　goals　as“manufacturing　large　quantities　of　cars’≠刀@efficiently　as　a　large－lot
production，　and　also　as　uniquely　and　individually　as　in　small－lot　production，　but　without
abandoning　the　economy　of　scale　that　is　a　basic　tenet　of　mass　production”【Pillar，　F．　T．　and
Waringer，　D．（1999），p．152】．　In　this　sense，　the　concept　of　car　modularization　might　be　re－
garded　as　a　kind　of　the　product－and　process－innovation　aiming　at　production　en　masse　that
nonetheless　fulfils　uniquely　individualized　requirements　in　the　market．　Again　paraphras－
ing　the　Pillar　and　Wallinger　once　more，　it　can　also　be　called　a　kind　of“mass　customization”
that　does　its　best　to　deliver　products　suiting　individual　customers’needs　for　the　same　price
as　standard　mass－produced　goods【vide　Piller，　F．　T．　and　w母ringer，　D．（1999），　P．155】．　The
advanced　strategy　of　modularization　may　perhaps　best　be　understood，　not　as　a　movement
in　the　direction　of“large　variety　and　small　lot　production”with“lean　production”aims，　but
（at　the　level　of　automotive　manufactures，　at　least）as　an・evolution　towards　a　breakthrough
in　new　forms　of“large　variety　and　large　lot　mass　production”．　In　this　respect，　we　can　also
lnterpret　modularization　as　a　production－system　innovation　ultimately　related　to　principles
of“flexible　Fordism”．
　　　It　has　often　been　pointed　out　that　the　weak　points　of　modularization　are　also　in　evi－
dence，　especially　the　phenomenon　of“cannibalization”：such　problems　have　appeared　in
aggravated　form　within　the　VW　group，　which　has　been　the　boldest　and　most　active　pro－
moter　of　car　platform　communization【Frank］『berter。A　llgemeine　Zeitung，2003．4．10】．　In　recent
years，　the　strategies　of　strengthening　individual　brand　power　have　markedly　increased　in
lmportance．　This　is　why　that　the　VW　Group　has　lately　been　making　extraordinary　efforts
to　acquire　one　luxury’car　brand　one　after　another，　to　improve　brand　power　and　market
name－value，　and　to　set　up　a　customer　center　and　large－scale　car　theme－park（“Autostadt”）
next　tq　its　factory　at　the　headquarters　of　the　firm．　This　indicates　that　VW　managers　plainly
recognize　that　product　standardization　increases　in　direct　ratio　to　the　significance　attach－
ing　to　product　brand　power（differentiation）。
5．Concluding　Remarks
　　　As　we　have　already　attempted　to　demonstrate，　during　the　l990s，　against　the　back－
ground　of　constantly　intensifying　global　competition　and　world－wide　over－capacities．　The
“Big　Three”of　the　German　automotive　industry　have　been　confronted　with　the　task　of
strengthening　their　cost－competitive　fronts，　meanwhile　increasingly　maintaining　and　im－
proving　brand　value（brand　power）．　They　have　sought　to　accomplish　these　aims　by　thor－
oughly　mastering　the　techniques　of“lean　production”：aproduction　system　practiced　at
their“Transplant”subsidiaries　outside　Germany　and　subsequently　introduced　at　a「domes一
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tic　level．　However，　at　the　same　time，　this　adoption　of“lean　production”was　also　accompa－
nied　by　friction　resulting　clashes　with　various　Germany－specific　institutional　and　cultural
conditions－especially　the　formidable　presence　of　labour　unions　and　works　councils．
Therefore，　social　adaptation　effort　through“negotiation　and　compromise”or“cultural
screening”have　always　been　requested．　In　addition，　we　can　not　that　this　learning　process
fostered　the　evolution　and　development　of　a　new　product－and　process－innovation；
“modularization”．
　　　Thus，　it　can　be　said　that　there　was（and　is）no“one　best”universal　applicative　produc－
tion　system，　such　as　the“lean　production”system　advocated　by　MIT－reSearcher．　To　the
contrary－it　seems，　rather，　that　there　were（and，　it　goes　without　saying，　are）various　plural
“best”production　systems　that　can　function　simultaneously　in　different　firms　and　areas．
These　many　and　various　systems　arise　from　the　processes　of　production－system　evolution
resulting　from　the　interaction　of　each　firm’s　rationalization　efforts　in　combination　with
intrinsic“given”conditions：individual“company　culture”，　unions，　works　councils，　competi－
tive　strategy　or　similarly　pertinent　factors4．　At　the　same　time，　judging　from　the　recent
findings　of　comparative　production－system　studies，　it　also　appear　that，　in　accordance　with
the　marked　advance　of　globalization，　inter－company　comparisons　have　become　far　more
r，elevant　to　contemporary　research　than　the　previously　accepted　paradigms　of　international
comparison，　In　the　world　as　it　is　today，　comparisons　between　individual　global－scale　enter－
prises（the　VW　group，　for　instance，　Daimler－Benz，　Nissan，　Toyota　or　other　firms）are　poten－
tially　more　significant　than　earlier　concepts，　such　as“German　mode1”or“Japanese　model”，
that　were　the　rule　in　the　order，　more　narrowly　nation－based　comparison　standards　of　the
1980s，
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